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Abstract: 
This study deals with the allocation of international and domestic flights (allocation of services) 
among multiple airports in a metropolitan area. We present a spatial model of the metropolitan area 
in which two airports provide services for two types of air transportation (international and 
domestic). The model describes the user’s airport choice, competition among carriers, and the 
pricing and service choices of airport operators. We examine three types of airport operation: 
separate operation by two private firms (PP), integrated operation by a single private firm (M), and 
integrated operation by the government (G). By means of numerical simulations based on realistic 
parameter values, we obtained the following results: i) allocation of services vary depending on the 
location of airports and types of operation; ii) welfare gain from the regulation of service choice is 
relatively small compared to regulation of airport charges.  
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1.0 Introduction 
It is observed that some metropolitan areas have multiple airports, each of which has a different 
role. For example, in the Osaka Metropolitan Area, Japan, Osaka International Airport specializes in 
serving domestic flights, while Kansai International Airport serves both international and domestic 
flights. This division of roles among multiple airports is called the allocation of services in this 
paper. The allocation of services might be the result of governmental regulation or decentralized 
decision-making by airport operators. New airports have recently begun to be constructed and 
operated privately, while existing public airports have been privatized. Furthermore, private 
operations may take different forms in multiple airport settings. In some metropolitan areas, each 
airport is operated independently (separate operation), while in others a single private firm operates 
all airports (integrated operation)1. These various types of operations would lead to different results 
concerning the allocation of services among airports. In addition, the locations of airports might 
affect the allocation of services among them. For example, in some cities, airports closer to the 
CBD provide only domestic (or short-distance) flights, while the others serve both domestic and 
international (or both short-distance and long-distance) flights2. Our study attempts to address these 
questions: how the locations of airports affect the allocation of services among multiple airports; 
                                                 
1 In London, two of the three major airports, Heathrow and Stansted, are operated by a single private operator, 
BAA, while the other airport, Gatwick, is operated by a different private operator. On the other hand, in Paris, all 
three airports, Charles de Gaulle, Orly, and Beauvais, are operated by a single private firm, ADP. 
2 This kind of the allocation is observed in some cities, such as NYC, Paris, Seoul, Tokyo, and Osaka. In contrast, 
in Amsterdam and Melbourne, airports closer to the CBD provide both domestic and international flights while 
other airports provides only domestic. 
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how the different types of operation alter the allocation of services and affect the economic welfare; 
and how large the welfare gain from regulation of the service choice is. 
In many real cases, the construction for new airports in a metropolitan area arises from the need 
for additional airports to address the shortage of capacity in existing airports. Therefore, airport 
congestion is an indispensable factor in the discussion of multiple airports. There is substantial 
literature on airport congestion (Brueckner (2002), Pels and Verhoef (2004), Zhang and Zhang 
(2006)). Most papers discuss the effect of congestion pricing at a single airport, but few focus the 
allocation of flights between airports. Pels et al. (2000) first developed a model to describe 
competition between multiple airports. Their model incorporates users’ choice of airports and 
carriers’ competition, but it assumes that airport operators set charges by average cost pricing. In 
practice, however, private airport operators may choose decision variables that maximize their 
profits, while public operators may determine choices that maximize social welfare. With airports 
and seaports in mind, De Borger and Van Dender (2006) introduce pricing and capacity choice in 
the model of competition between congestible facilities. They consider two types of private 
operation: separate operation by private firms and integrated operation by a single private firm. 
Basso and Zhang (2007) extended the model of De Borger and Van Dender (2006) by introducing 
the vertical relationship among users, carriers, and airport operators. These earlier works suppose a 
single type of service, so the allocation of services is not a consideration3. 
                                                 
3 Van Dender (2005) incorporates two different types of services in a model of competition between two facility 
operators. However, he focuses on the case that each facility provides all types of services, and so does not 
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In this study we construct a model in which two airports may provide services for two types of air 
transportation (international and domestic)4, and the allocation of services is variable. The model 
describes interaction among users choices, carriers’ competition, and airport operators’ service 
choices. Using this model, we examine the allocation of services among airports in a metropolitan 
area under three alternative forms of airport operations: (1) each airport is operated by a single 
private firm (Regime PP); (2) a single private firm operates two airports (Regime M); (3) the 
government operates two airports (Regime G). 
In our model, the role of the airport operator is to choose the types of service and the level of 
airport charge. In reality, however, private operators are not necessarily free to choose these 
decision variables. They often face regulations on airport charges and types of services to be 
provided at airports5. Thus, we consider three cases that differ in the freedom of choice for airport 
operators. First, we consider the case of variable airport charges and service choices, in which 
airport operators set both airport charges and the services to be provided at their airports. The 
second case, the surplus-maximizing allocation, supposes that the government regulates the service 
                                                                                                                                                                  
examine alternative allocations. 
4 The presence of airport congestion is an important factor for modeling how many services should be provided at 
airports. If present, airport congestion generates an interaction between different types of services (e. g., domestic 
or international flights) provided at an airport. Consequently, it is necessary to develop a model with multiple 
services at airports, and the problem is to obtain the combination of services provided at two airports. 
In contrast, if airport congestion is absent, there is no interaction between different services at airports; 
therefore, the problem for each service is solved independently to determine the number of airports providing a 
particular type of service. This problem resembles the one studied by Takahashi (2004) and Akutagawa and Mun 
(2005). In those two articles, providers of public service decide whether to provide the service at its facility. 
5 Several studies deal with the regulation of airports due to a growing number of privatized airports. Most of these 
studies focused on the regulation on pricing (e. g. Oum et al. (2004) and Czerny (2006)), and not only on service 
choices. 
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choices such that the social surplus is maximized, while airport operators are free to choose airport 
charges. The third case is that of parametric airport charges, where airport operators choose the 
services to be provided at their airports while airport charges are exogenously given. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and describes the 
behaviors of users and carriers. Section 3 shows the simulation results for variable airport charges 
and service choices. Sections 4 and 5 report the results for the cases of surplus-maximizing 
allocation and parametric airport charges, respectively. Section 6 evaluates the welfare gains of 
regulations on the allocation and airport charges by comparing the results obtained in the 
proceeding three sections. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2.0 The Model 
2.1 The Basic Setting 
Suppose a linear space, as illustrated in Figure 1, which consists of the City and the Hinterland: 
<<Figure 1: About here>> 
Each location is identified by the coordinate value of x, where the origin of coordinates (x = 0) is at 
the center of the City. The City is represented by the segment [ , ]x b b∈ − , and the Hinterland is 
outside this segment. Individuals are uniformly distributed with density Cρ  within the City, and 
Hρ  within the Hinterland. Naturally, we assume H Cρ ρ< . 
The City has two airports, Airports 1 and 2, whose locations are exogenously given and denoted 
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by x1 and x2 respectively. Without loss of generality, we assume that x1 < x2. Moreover, we assume 
that airport 2 is located at the fringe of the City: that is, x2 = b. Airport 1 is congestible while airport 
2 is free from congestion6. The congestion costs, including extra labor, fuel costs due to delay, and 
the like, are incurred by carriers. 
These two airports can provide two types of service, international and domestic flights, which are 
hereafter denoted by I and D, respectively. Let us denote by aj (aj = I, D, ID, N) the type of services 
provided at airport j, where aj = I (D) means that the airport is specialized in international 
(domestic) flights, aj = ID indicates that the airport provides both international and domestic flights, 
and aj = N indicates that the airport is closed. The allocation of services is represented by the 
combination of services provided at two airports, (a1, a2). Table 1 summarizes the possible 16 
allocations7. 
<<Table 1: About here>> 
2.2 Users 
The trip demand for service S (S = I, D) is inelastic at the individual level, but aggregate demand 
is elastic. Each individual makes type S trips dS times per given period unless the trip cost exceeds 
the reservation price, SC  (S = I, D). All individuals have the same value of the reservation price 
                                                 
6 This situation supposes that airport 2 is newly constructed to address the shortage of capacity in airport 1. 
Examples are Montreal, Tokyo, and Osaka. Moreover, in these cases, the newly constructed airport is located at 
the fringe of the city, and suffers from shortage of demand compared to capacity. 
7 We do not exclude the possibility of the allocations such as (N, N), (S, N), and (N, S), in which some services are 
not provided in this region. In such a case, we assume that users of the services are not available at both airports 
and choose other modes, such as autos or railways. 
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for trip type S, SC . In addition, we introduce two assumptions, D Id d>  and I DC C> : the 
frequency of domestic trips is greater than that for international, and the reservation price for 
international trips is higher than that for domestic. 
Let us denote by ( )SjC x  the trip cost for a user located at x using airport j for trip of type S, 
which is defined as: 





vhC x t x x P
F
= − + +  for j = 1, 2 and S = I, D.   (1) 
The first term on the RHS of Eq. (1) represents the access cost to airport j that is proportional to the 
distance between the locations of the user (x) and the airport (xj), in which t is the access cost per 
distance. The second term is the average waiting time cost at airport j, in which SjF  is the 
frequency of service S at airport j. The average waiting time cost is expressed as the value of 
waiting time, v, multiplied by the average waiting time for service S at airport j, / 4 Sjh F , for the 
given operating hours of airport j, h8. The last term, SjP , is the fare for service S at airport j.  
When an individual located at x decides to make a trip of type S, she chooses the airport where 
the trip cost is lower. Note that, in our model, the service is not necessarily provided at all airports. 
We set ( )SjC x = ∞  if the service S is not available at the airport j. In addition, if she makes a trip of 
type S, the lower trip cost should be almost as high as the reservation price SC : that is, 
( ){ }minS SjjC C x≥ . Therefore, the trip demand generated from x for service S at airport j, ( )Sjq x , is 
calculated by: 
                                                 
8 This expression of the average waiting time is based on the assumption that trip demand is uniformly distributed 
across the time of day. 
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 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
       if  for  and ,
      if  for , ,  and .
S S S
C j iS
j S S S
H j i
d C x C x b x b i j
q x
d C x C x x b b x i j
ρ
ρ
 ≤ − ≤ ≤ ≠=  ≤ < − < ≠
  (2) 
Using Eq. (2), the aggregate demand for service S (S = I, D) at airport j (j = 1, 2) is calculated as: 




Q q x dx= ∫        (3) 
where Sjz  and 
S
jz , respectively, represent the locations of the right and left ends of the catchments 
area for service S at airport j. By solving Eq. (3) for airfare, SjP , we have the inverse demand 
function for service S at airport j, ( )Sjp
SF , where 1 2( , )
S SF F=SF . 
To determine the boundaries, Sjz  and 
S
jz , we should distinguish two cases:  
i) When service S is only provided at airport j, or when two airports provide service S and 
these catchments areas are separated, the trip cost at the boundaries is equalized to the 
reservation price: ( ) ( )SS S S Sjj j jC z C z C= = . 
ii) Two airports provide service S and these catchments areas share the boundary: that is, 
21
SSz z= . In this case, at this boundary, 21 SSz z= , the trip costs for both airports are 
equalized: ( ) ( )21 1 2 SS S S SC z C z C= < . At the boundaries, 1Sz  and 2Sz , the trip cost is equalized 
to the reservation price: ( ) ( )11 2 2SS S S SC z C z C= = . 
2.3 Carriers 
We assume that there are two carriers in each market S (S = I, D). Let us denote by Skjf  the 
number of flights at airport j (j = 1, 2) is operated by carrier k (k = 1, 2) in market S. We assume 
symmetric equilibrium in which two carriers in each market provide the same number of flights 
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with the same schedule at each airport. This situation is realized through competition in the 
schedule of flights9. Consequently, the frequency of service S at airport j perceived by users, SjF , is 
equal to Skjf . 
All flights from each airport are served with full capacity, σ . In addition, carrier k, providing 
service S at airport j, faces the inverse demand ( )Sjp +Sk Slf f 10, in which 1 2( , )Skf Sk Skf f=  and 
1 2( , )
Slf Sl Slf f= , respectively, represent the vectors of frequencies provided by carriers k and l in 
market S. As a result, each carrier providing service S earns revenue equal to ( )Sjp σ+Sk Slf f  per 
flight from airport j. A carrier incurs the marginal cost Sjm  and the airport charge Sjr  for each 
flight. Since carriers encounter congestion when they use airport 1, the marginal cost , ,Sjm varies 
between airports: 
 1 1, ,
S S Sk
S k
m c fω= + ∑  
 2 ,
S Sm ω=  
where Sω  and c capture the marginal cost of an operation and congestion. Through the congestion 
cost at airport 1, the profits of carriers providing service S are affected by the number of flights for 
the other service, T. Therefore, the profit of carrier k providing service S from airport j , ,Skjπ is, 
 ( ) ( ), ,Sk S S S Skj j j j jp m r fπ σ = + − − Sk - Sk Slf f f f     (4) 
where f- is a vector composed of two types of elements: the number of flights at two airports 
                                                 
9 This result is based on the minimum product differentiation by Hotelling (1929). 
10 Since S Sk Slj j jF f f= + , the inverse demand ( )Sjp SF  is rewritten as: 
 1 1 2 2( ) ( , ) ( ).
S S Sk Sl Sk Sl S
j j jp p f f f f p= + + = +S Sk SlF f f  
Detailed expressions are given in Appendix A. 
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provided by the other carrier l providing the same service S, Sljf , and the number of flights 
provided by carriers in the other service market T, Tkjf : 
 ( )1 1 2 21 2 1 2 1 2, , , , ,Sl Sl T T T Tf f f f f f=-f  for , , , .S T I D T S= ≠  
In addition, we assume the quantity (Cournot) competition: each carrier chooses the frequency. 
Each carrier chooses the vector 1 2( , )Skf Sk Skf f=  to maximize the sum of the profits from two 
airports, i.e., ( , )Skjjπ∑ Sk -f f . Let us denote by Sk*f  carrier k’s Nash Equilibrium frequencies at two 
airports; then, it satisfies: 
 ( )arg max , ,Skj
j
π= ∑skSk* Sk -*ff f f  for S = I, D and k = 1, 2, 
where -*f  is the vector of the Nash Equilibrium frequencies set by the other carriers11. Since the 
equilibrium frequency of carrier k at airport j depends on the airport charges, ( , )I Dj jr r=jr , and the 
services provided at both airports, aj (j = 1, 2), the equilibrium frequency of carrier k providing 
service S at airport j is expressed as 1 2( , ; , )Skjf a a∗ 1 2r r . 
2.4 Airports 
An airport operator chooses the services to be provided at its airport and sets the level of airport 
charge. Two types of operators are considered, a private firm and the government. The private firm 
maximizes the airport charge revenue while the government maximizes the social surplus.  
This paper examines the following three alternative regimes of the airport operation: 
                                                 
11 Note that carriers may not choose to use one of two airports even if both airports are open for use. This case 
corresponds to the corner solution: 0Sk Sli if f= =  is obtained as an optimal solution for a carrier. In other cases, 
the airport operator does not allow the use of flights for a particular service, S. In this situation, carriers providing 
service S should solve the problem with the constraint of 0Sk Sli if f= = . 
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Regime PP: each airport is operated by a single private firm. 
Regime M: a single private firm operates two airports. 
Regime G: the government operates two airports. 
2.5 The Sequence of Decisions 
The sequence of decisions is as follows. First, the services to be provided at each airport, ja (j = 
1, 2), are determined, then the airport operator(s) set the levels of airport charge, Sjr . Next, carriers 
choose the number of flights at each airport, Skjf , as described in Subsection 2.3. Finally, as 
explained in Subsection 2.2, users choose whether or not to use service S and the airport at which to 
use the service. 
Considering the presence of government regulations, this study examines three possibilities 
regarding the freedom of choices for airport operators: 
i) Variable Airport Charges and Service Choices: The airport operators are free to choose 
the services in the airports and the levels of airport charge. 
ii) Surplus-Maximizing Allocation: The government chooses the services provided at two 
airports in order to maximize the social surplus. Then the airport operators set airport 
charges at their airports. 
iii) Parametric Airport Charges: Airport charges are exogenously fixed. The airport 
operators solely set services to be provided at their airports. 
Case ii) supposes that the government controls the types of services to be provided at each airport, 
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and case iii) corresponds to the situation where the airport charges are regulated. Fixing some 
decision variables is useful for not only evaluating the effects of regulation, but also for 
investigating the effects of different decision variables separately. The analysis in ii) and iii) 
clarifies the effect of decentralized decision making on pricing and service choices, respectively. 
The result for the case i) is reported in Section 3, and Sections 4 and 5 discuss the allocations under 
the presence of regulations, i.e., the results of cases ii) and iii). 
 
3.0 Variable Airport Charges and Service Choices 
This section postulates that airport operators are free to choose both airport charges and the 
services provided at their airports. In each regime, the operator first determines the services 
provided at their airports, and then airport charges.  
3.1 Decisions of Airport Operators under Alternative Regimes 
3.1.1 Regime PP 
The game between two operators is solved backward. Given the allocation, (a1, a2), each operator 
simultaneously sets the airport charges, Sjr , so as to maximize the revenue, ( ; , )j j iR a aj ir ,r : 
 ( ) ( )* 1 2
, 1,2
; , ; , .S Skj j i j j
S I D k
R a a r f a a
= =
= ∑ ∑j i 1 2r ,r r ,r     (5) 
Let us denote by ( )1 2, ;a a PP*jr  the vector of the airport charges set by the operator j at Nash 
Equilibrium, and it satisfies12: 
                                                 
12 In some locations of airport 1, x1, we assume that each operator, j, plays the strategy that prevents undercutting 
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r r ,r    (6) 
Plugging Eq. (6) into Eq. (5), we have: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 2 1 2, , ; , ; ; , .j j i j j iR a a R a a PP a a PP a a= * *j ir ,r    (7) 
At the Nash Equilibrium of the service choice game, the service chosen by the operator j, ( )ja PP∗ , 
is the best response against the choice of the other operator i, ( )ia PP∗ . By using Eq. (7), this can 
be expressed as: 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ), ,     for , 1, 2, .j j i j j i j jR a PP a PP R a a PP a a PP j i j∗ ∗ ∗ ∀ ∗≥ ≠ = ≠  
According to this, we obtain the allocation under Regime PP, ( ) ( )( )1 2,a PP a PP∗ ∗ . 
3.1.2 Regime M 
The monopolistic operator first sets the allocation, (a1, a2), and then airport charges, Sjr , so as to 
maximize the sum of revenues, 1 2( ; , )R a a1 2r ,r : 
 ( ) ( )*1 2 1 2
1,2 , 1,2
; , , ; , .S Skj j
j S I D k
R a a r f a a
= = =
= ∑ ∑ ∑1 2 1 2r ,r r r     (8) 
Given the allocation, (a1, a2), the charges at airport j set by the monopolistic operator, 
( )1 2, ;a a M*jr , are derived as follows: 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )1 2 1 2 1 2, ; , , ; arg max ; , .a a M a a M R a a=
1 2
* *
1 2 1 2r ,r
r r r ,r    (9) 
By substituting (9) into (8), we define 1 2( , )R a a  as: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2, , ; , , ; ; , .R a a R a a M a a M a a= * *1 2r r  
According to this, the allocation under Regime M, 1 2( ( ), ( ))a M a M∗ ∗ , is derived as follows: 
                                                                                                                                                                  
by its competitor i. Alternatively, we solve problem (6) with the constraint ( ) ( ) S Sj j i jC x C x= . 
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 ( ) ( )
1 2
1 2 1 2,
( ), ( ) arg max , .
a a
a M a M R a a∗ ∗ =  
3.1.3 Regime G 
Given the allocation, (a1, a2), the government determines the airport charges so as to maximize 
the social surplus 1 2( ; , )SW a a1 2r ,r : 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 2
, 1,2 , 1,2






S S S Sk
j j
S I D j S I D kz
SW a a q x C C x dx R a aπ
= = = =
 = − + + ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑∫1 2 1 2r ,r r ,r  (10) 
where, starting from the left, three terms in the RHS respectively represent the consumer surplus, 
the sum of carriers’ profits, and the airport charge revenue under the given allocation (a1, a2). By 
using the equilibrium condition, ( ) ( )* 1 2, ; ,S S Skj j j
k
Q q x dx f a a= =∑∫ 1 2r r , Eq. (10) is rewritten as: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
* *
1 2 1 2 1 2
, , , ,
2
*
1 2 1 1 2
, ,
; , , ; , , ; ,






S Sk S Sk
j j




S j S S kz
SW a a C f a a f a a




 − − − −   
∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑∫
1 2 1 2 1 2
1 2
r ,r r r r r
r r
 
         (11) 
The first two terms in the RHS respectively indicate the sum of the trip benefit and the operating 
cost. The last three terms are the aggregate access cost, the scheduling cost, and the congestion cost. 
In the fourth term of the RHS, 1 2( , )Sn a a  shows the number of airports providing service S under 
the allocation (a1, a2): for example, ( , ) ( , ) 2S Sn ID ID n ID S= =  since service S is provided at two 
airports under both allocations (ID, ID) and (ID, S). 
Under the allocation (a1, a2), the charges at each airport j set by the government, ( )1 2, ;a a G*jr , 
satisfy the following relationship: 
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 ( ) ( )( ) ( )1 2 1 2 1 2, ; , , ; arg max ; , .a a G a a G SW a a=
1 2
* *
1 2 1 2r ,r
r r r ,r    (12) 
By substituting Eq.(12) into Eq.(10), we define 1 2( , )SW a a  as: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2, , ; , , ; ; , .SW a a SW a a G a a G a a= * *1 2r r  
According to this, the allocation under Regime G, 1 2( ( ), ( ))a G a G∗ ∗ , is obtained as follows: 
 ( ) ( )
1 2
1 2 1 2,
( ), ( ) arg max , .
a a
a G a G SW a a∗ ∗ =  
3.2 Allocations under Alternative Regimes 
Allocations under the three alternative regimes are obtained by means of numerical simulation. 
We choose the values of parameters so that the solutions of the model fit the observed value in the 
real world. The size of the City is set as the segment of [–50, 50] according to the data of the Osaka 
Metropolitan Area. Other parameter values are summarized in Table 213: 
<<Table 2: About here>> 
Figure 2 shows the allocations under the three alternative regimes: 
<<Figure 2: About here>> 
According to Figure 2, under Regime PP, the allocation (ID, ID) is realized regardless of the 
location of airport 1, x1. On the other hand, the results under the Regimes M and G depend on the 
location (ID, ID) is emerged if 1x  is small, i.e., locations of the two airports are sufficiently distant 
from each other. As the distance between the two airports becomes shorter, the allocation changes 
from (ID, ID) to (D, ID), and then to (N, ID). The domain of (ID, ID) under Regime M is larger than 
                                                 
13 Explanation for the rest of the parameter values and the result of the calibration are summarized in Appendix B. 
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that under Regime G. This result implies that private operations lead to excessive entry of services 
(too many services provided). 
Let us take a closer look at the mechanism underlying different results between regimes. For 
1
My x≤  in Figure 2, (ID, ID) is realized under Regime PP while (D, ID) occurs under Regime M. 
This implies that changing from (ID, ID) to (D, ID) decreases the revenue in airport 1 while it 
increases the sum of revenue from the two airports. To see this, we decompose the difference in 
revenue at airport 1 between (ID, ID) and (D, ID), as follows: 
 ( ) ( )1 1 1 1, , ,I DR D ID R ID ID R R− = ∆ + ∆      (13) 
where SjR∆  is the difference in the revenue from S (S = I, D) at airport j (j = 1, 2). In (13), 1IR∆  is 
negative since revenue from service I at the airport under (D, ID) is zero. 1DR∆  is positive since 
congestion at airport 1 is eased by changing from (ID, ID) to (D, ID), and this reduction of 
congestion induces an increase in demand for domestic flights at airports. However, the former 
effect dominates the latter for the whole range of 1x , so the RHS of Eq. (13) is negative. In other 
words, the operator of airport 1 does not have an incentive to stop providing service I. 
On the other hand, the difference in the sum of revenues from two airports is 
 ( ) ( ) 1 1 2 2, , .I D I DR D ID R ID ID R R R R− = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆     (14) 
For 1My x≤  in Figure 2, the RHS of (14) is positive, thus the monopolistic operator chooses (D, 
ID) instead of (ID, ID). In Eq. (14), 2IR∆  is positive since service I is concentrated at airport 2 
under the allocation (D, ID), while 2DR∆  is negative due to the reduction in the congestion at 
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airport 114. The sum of these two terms, 2 2 2I DR R R∆ = ∆ + ∆ , is always positive because the increase 
in the revenue from service I, 2IR∆ , dominates. Under Regime PP, recall that 1 1 1 0I DR R R∆ = ∆ + ∆ < : 
the operator of airport 1 always loses revenue by changing the service from ID to D. However, 
under Regime M, the monopolistic operator may earn more revenue by choosing (D, ID) instead of 
(ID, ID); it recovers the loss at airport 1, 1R∆ , by the gain at airport 2, 2R∆ . This difference leads 
to the different results in the allocations between two regimes, PP and M. As x1 increases, changes 
in revenues at both airports, 1R∆  and 2R∆ , increase15; subsequently, for 1My x≤ , the monopolistic 
operator can increase the revenue by changing the allocation from (ID, ID) to (D, ID). 
 Let us look at the difference between Regimes M and G. For 1
G My x y≤ ≤  in Figure 2, the 
allocation (ID, ID) emerges under Regime M while (D, ID) emerges under Regime G. This means 
that, within this range of 1x , changing from (ID, ID) to (D, ID) decreases the sum of revenue from 
two airports while it increases the social surplus. For 1
G My x y≤ ≤ , the sign of Eq. (14) is negative, 
since the loss of the revenue at airport 1, 1R∆ , exceeds the gain at airport 2, 2R∆ , thus the private 
operator chooses the allocation (ID, ID) instead of (D, ID). 
The government considers the welfares of users and carriers as well as the revenue from airport 
                                                 
14 When changing the allocation from (ID, ID) to (D, ID), the congestion at airport 1 is reduced. This reduction in 
the congestion induces service D carriers to reallocate flights between the two airports. Due to the advantage of 
location, service D flights at airport 1 always increase while those at airport 2 decrease. 
15 The values of 1R∆  and 2R∆  varies with the location of airport 1, and depends on the change in the revenue 
from service I at each airport j (i.e., Ij jR R∆ ≈ ∆ ). As the distance between the two airports decreases, the 
catchments area of service I under (D, ID) approaches the one under (ID, ID). This implies that, as distance 
decreases, the loss in the catchment area of airport 1 shrinks while the gain in the catchment area of airport 2 
expands. Alternatively, the changes in the revenues of the two airports, 1R∆  and 2R∆ , increase as x1 increases. 
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charges. The difference in the social surplus between the allocations (ID, ID) and (D, ID) is 
decomposed into three parts: 
 ( ) ( )
, , 1,2
, , ,S S j
S I D S I D j
SW D ID SW ID ID CS Rπ
= = =
− = ∆ + ∆ + ∆∑ ∑ ∑       (15) 
where the three terms in the RHS respectively represent the changes in consumer surplus, profits of 
carriers, and airport charge revenue. For 1
Gy x≤  in Figure 2, the RHS of (15) is positive because 
the gains of users, S
S
CS∆∑ , and carriers, SS π∆∑ , dominate the decrease in the revenue, 
jj
R∆∑ : therefore, the public operator chooses the allocation (D, ID) instead of (ID, ID). 
Let us explain in detail the gains of users and carriers. Service I users receive the greatest gain of 
all users (i.e., S I
S
CS CS∆ ≈ ∆∑ ); it is split into three parts: 
 
( ) ( )












I I I I
j j
j z z
CS CS D ID CS ID ID
vh C f t q x x x dx q x x x dxσ σ
∆ = −
  ≈ + ∆ + − − −  
∑ ∫ ∫  (16) 
where ( ) ( )2 ,, ,I Ik Ikjk j kf f D ID f ID ID∆ = −∑ ∑ . In Eq. (16), the three terms of the RHS 
respectively represent the changes in the scheduling cost, the trip benefit, and the access cost16. The 
first term of the RHS in Eq. (16), the change in the scheduling cost, is always positive, and it is 
constant for the location of airport 1, x1. In contrast, the last two terms are negative, and these terms 
decrease as x1 increases (i.e., the distance between the two airports decreases) since the catchment 
area of service I under (D, ID) approaches that under (ID, ID). As a result, for 1
Gy x≤  in Figure 2, 
                                                 
16 In addition to these three components, the consumer surplus of service I is affected by the change in the fare. 
However, since the change in the fare affects service I carriers in the opposite direction, the effect of the change in 
the fare is cancelled when comparing the social surplus. 
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the sign of the RHS in Eq. (16) becomes positive. 
Changing the allocation from (ID, ID) to (D, ID) affects the profits of both service I and service 
D carriers. The change in the service I carriers’ profit is decomposed as: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1
, 1,2
, , , , .I I I I I Sk Ik
S k k
D ID ID ID f c f ID ID f ID IDπ π π ω
=
∆ = − ≈ − ∆ + ×∑ ∑  (17) 
Eq. (17) shows the change in the profit of service I carriers, resulting from the reductions in 
operating cost (the first term of the RHS) and congestion cost (the second term of the RHS). 
Independent from the location of airport 117, the sum of these two effects is always positive18. 
The change in the profits of service D carriers is decomposed as: 
 ( ) ( ) 1 1, , ,D D D DD ID ID ID c f fπ π π∆ = − ≈ ∆ ×∆     (18) 
where 




f f ID ID f D ID∆ = −∑ ∑  and ( ) ( )1 1 1, , .D Dk Dk
k k
f f ID ID f D ID∆ = −∑ ∑  
Eq. (18) indicates that the change in the profit of service D carriers is equal to the reduction in the 
congestion cost at airport 1. This reduction in the congestion cost always increases the profit of 
service D carriers, and this increases as airport 1 locates closer to airport 2. These gains by users 
and carriers are not considered in the private operator’s decision making. This causes different 
allocations between two regimes, M and G, within the range of 1
G My x y≤ ≤  in Figure 2. 
                                                 
17 Although the value of x1 does not affect the sign of Iπ∆ , the magnitudes of these two effects vary with the 
location of airport 1. As x1 increases, the reduction in the congestion cost increases because airport 1 serves the 
larger area of the City, while the reduction in the operating cost decreases as the distance between two airports 
decreases because the difference in the catchment area between two locations becomes smaller. 
18 This does not imply that service I carriers always prefer operating at airport 2 than at two airports because we 
ignore the effect of the change in the fare, which is cancelled between users and carriers when we calculate the 
social surplus. 
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Table 3 compares the social surpluses and the airport charges under three regimes: 
<<Table 3: About here>> 
In Table 3, the government always sets negative airport charges in order to remedy the distortion 
from the market power of carriers. In addition, the airport charges under Regime M are always the 
highest among three regimes because the monopolistic operator abuses its market power in 
determining the airport charges. Note that for 1x =0 and 25, the allocation of services under 
Regime M coincides with that under Regime G, which is different from that of Regime PP. This 
suggests that the service choice under Regime M is more efficient than under Regime PP. Under 
Regime M, however, inefficiency in the determination of airport charges is dominant, making the 
social surplus lower than that under Regime PP. 
 
4.0 Surplus-Maximizing Allocation: Regulation of the Service Choice 
This section supposes that the government regulates the service choices, so that the allocation is 
chosen to maximize the social surplus while the airport charges are set by the operators. 
Alternatively, this section postulates the optimal regulation of the service choice. This type of 
regulation is observed in some metropolitan areas, such as Milan, Tokyo, Osaka, Seoul, and 
Shanghai. 
As in Section 3, given the allocation, (a1, a2), the operator under Regime Z (Z = PP, M, G) sets 
the charges at airport j as ( )1 2, ;a a Z*jr . Taking this into account, the surplus-maximizing allocation 
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under Regime Z is derived as follows: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )
1 2
1 21 2 1 2, 1 2
, ; ,( ), ( ) arg max ; , ,  for , , .;O O
a a
a a Za Z a Z SW a a Z Ga Pa MZ P= =* *1 2r ,r  
Recall that, under Regime G in Section 3, both the allocation and the airport charge are determined 
in order to maximize the social surplus. The surplus-maximizing allocation under Regime G 
becomes identical to the allocation under Regime G in Section 3. 
Figure 3 shows the surplus-maximizing allocations under the three regimes: 
<<Figure 3: About here>> 
Comparing Figure 3 with Figure 2, we observe that there is little difference in the results concerning 
the allocation of services. The results for Regimes PP and G are the same as in Section 2, while the 
result for Regime M is different. Domain of (ID, ID) under Regime M in Figure 3 is smaller than 
that in Figure 2, while the domain of (N, ID) in Figure 3 is larger than that in Figure 2. However, the 
difference is insignificant.  
Note that the results shown in both figures are obtained by assuming variable airport charges; 
i.e., airport operators choose the levels of airport charges. Therefore, if the allocation is identical, 
the levels of airport charges and consequently the social surpluses must be the same in Figures 2 
and 3. This implies that the service choices of private operators yield almost the same results as the 




5.0 Parametric Airport Charges: Regulation of Pricing 
This section supposes that airport operators determine the services to be provided at their airports 
while airport charges are exogenously fixed. This situation can be interpreted as the case where 
airport charges are regulated. Since airports are regarded as a local monopoly, the regulation of 
airport charges is justified to control their market power. In this case, the inefficiency due to private 
operation arises solely from the service choices of airport operators. 
We first formulate the operators’ decision making in Subsection 5.1. Subsection 5.2 shows the 
result based on airport charges in Kansai International Airport in Japan. 
5.1 Decisions of Airport Operators under Alternative Regimes 
5.1.1 Regime PP 
In this regime, each airport is operated by a single private firm. Given the fixed airport charge for 
each service S, Sjr , each operator j sets the service provided at its airport, ja , so as to maximize 
the revenue, ( ; , )j j iR a aj ir ,r  : 
 ( ) ( )* 1 2
, 1,2
; , , ; , .S Skj j i j j
S I D k
R a a r f a a
= =
= ∑ ∑j i 1 2r ,r r r     
Let us denote by ( )ja PP  the services chosen by the operator of airport j (j = 1, 2) at the Nash 
Equilibrium, which is the best response to the choice of the other airport i, ( )ia PP , i.e., 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ); , ; ,  for , 1,2, .j j i j j i j jR a PP a PP R a a PP a a PP j i j∀≥ ≠ = ≠j i j ir , r r ,r        
According to this, the allocation under Regime PP is derived as 1 2( ( ), ( ))a PP a PP  . 
5.1.2 Regime M 
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A single private firm operating two airports chooses the services provided at two airports, a1 and 
a2, so as to maximize the sum of revenue from two airports, 1 2( ; , )R a a1 2r ,r  : 
 ( ) ( )*1 2 1 2
1,2 , 1,2
; , , ; , .S Skj j
j S I D k
R a a r f a a
= = =
= ∑ ∑ ∑1 2 1 2r ,r r r     
The allocation under Regime M, 1 2( ( ), ( ))a M a M  , satisfies the following relationship: 
 ( ) ( )
1 2
1 2 1 2,
( ), ( ) arg max ; , .
a a
a M a M R a a= 1 2r ,r    
5.1.3 Regime G 
This regime supposes that the government operates two airports. The objective of the government 
is to maximize the social surplus, 1 2( ; , )SW a a1 2r ,r  , defined as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 2
, 1,2 , 1,2






S S S Sk
j j
S I D j S I D kz
SW a a q x C C x dx R a aπ
= = = =
 = − + + ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑∫1 2 1 2r ,r r ,r     
The allocation under Regime G, 1 2( ( ), ( ))a G a G   satisfies the following relationship: 
 ( ) ( )
1 2
1 2 1 2,
( ), ( ) arg max ; , .
a a
a G a G SW a a= 1 2r ,r    
5.2   Allocations under Alternative Regimes 
Airport charges for service S (S = I, D) at airport j (j = 1, 2), Sjr , are set as: 
 1 2 1537.39 (thousand yen),
I Ir r= =   
 1 2 718.08 (thousand yen).
D Dr r= =   
These values are drawn from actual airport charges for services I and D at Kansai International 
Airport in Japan. Figure 4 shows the allocations of services under the three alternative regimes. 
<<Figure 4: About here>> 
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In Figure 4, the domain of (ID, ID) is identical between the two private operations, Regimes PP 
and M. The identity of the domain of (ID, ID) is due to the choice of service I carriers; i.e., the 
service I carriers choose 1 0
Ikf =  (k = 1, 2) for 1x y>  in Figure 4, even though the operator of 
airport 1 allows service I. In fact, the operators’ choices under these two regimes are different, but 
the carriers’ choice is decisive in determining the allocation of services between airports19. The 
domain of (ID, ID) under Regime G is smaller than that under private operation (PP and M). This is 
explained similarly to the case of variable airport charges discussed in Section 3. 
 
6.0 Comparison of Regulations of Service Choice and Airport Charges 
In real cases, airport operators face the regulation of airport charges and of service choice. The 
regulation on levels of airport charges typically takes the form of the price cap regulation (e.g., 
London). Moreover, in some metropolitan areas, the service choices are regulated. For example, in 
East Asian cities (e.g., Tokyo, Osaka, Seoul, and Shanghai), airports closer to the CBD are allowed 
to serve only domestic flights. In addition, the perimeter rule implemented in some cities (e.g., NYC, 
Washington D.C, and Tokyo) can be another type of service choice regulation because it restricts 
airports closer to the CBD to serving flights operating within a certain range of distance. In this 
section, we evaluate the welfare effect of regulations described above. 
                                                 
19 When carriers providing service I choose whether or not to operate at two airports, they face the tradeoff 
between the revenue and the congestion cost. If a carrier operates flights at two airports, the revenue of a carrier is 
larger because the number of flights is larger. However, operating at airport 1 imposes the congestion cost. For 
1x y>  in Figure 4, even if private operators allow two services, ID, to airport 1, service I carriers choose 1 0Ikf =  
(k = 1, 2) because they can maximize their profits by avoiding the congestion cost. 
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In the three preceding sections, we have considered three situations where decision variables of 
operators differ: i.e., variable airport charges and service choices, surplus-maximizing allocation, 
and parametric airport charges. In the surplus-maximizing allocation, operators set levels of airport 
charges while service allocation maximizes the social surplus. The surplus-maximizing allocation 
can be interpreted as the optimal regulation of service choice. In the case of parametric airport 
charges, levels of airport charges are exogenously given while operators choose the service 
provided at airports. This situation corresponds to the case with the regulation of airport charges. 
Therefore, by comparing the social surplus under the three alternative situations, we can evaluate 
the welfare effect of regulations. 
The welfare effect of the regulation of service choices, ( );Z∆ 1 2r , r , is calculated as: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1 1 2; ; , ; , ,Z SW a G a G SW a Z a Z∆ = −1 2 1 2 1 2r , r r , r r , r      
where ( )ja G  and ( )ja Z , respectively, represent the service choices of airport j chosen by the 
government and by the private operator under Regime Z (Z = PP, M). ( );Z∆ 1 2r , r  is the difference 
between the levels of social surplus for Regime G and the private operations (PP and M), supposing 
that the levels of airport charges are set at exogenously given level jr . 
We compute the welfare effect of the regulation on levels of airport charges, ( )* 1 2; ,Z a a∆ , by: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )* 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2; , ; , , ; , , ; ; , ,Z a a SW a a SW a a Z a a Z a a∆ = − * *1 2 1 2r , r r r  
where jr  denotes the regulated level of airport charges, and 1 2( , ; )a a Z*jr  is the level of airport 
charges set by the private operator under Regime Z (Z = PP, M). Assuming that the allocation (a1, 
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a2) is given, ( )* 1 2; ,Z a a∆  compare the social surplus between the regulated airport charges, jr , and 
the charges set by the operator under Regime Z (Z = PP, M), ( )Z*jr . 
Table 4 shows ( );Z∆ 1 2r , r  and ( )* 1 2; ,Z a a∆ , at various locations of airport 1: 
<<Table 4: About Here>> 
In computing ( );Z∆ 1 2r , r  and ( )* 1 2; ,Z a a∆ , we use the levels of parametric airport charge shown in 
Subsection 5.2 as the regulated airport charges20. According to Table 4, the welfare effects of the 
regulation on the airport charges, ( )* 1 2; ,Z a a∆ , reach at least 41.5 billion yen21 while those of the 
regulation on the service choice, ( );Z∆ 1 2r , r , reach at most 7.1 billion yen. This indicates that 
regulation of the levels of airport charges might have significant impact on the social surplus 
compared to regulation of the service choice. Also note that ( );Z∆ 1 2r , r  has positive value only at 
1 10x = , straightforwardly from the results shown in Figure 4. Specifically, under the parametric 
airport charges, the allocations under private operation differ from that under Regime G within the 
narrow range of x1, which implies that the regulation of the service choice has a limited effect in 
improving the social welfare22. Therefore, the rationale for the regulation of the service choice is 
                                                 
20 Instead of parametric airport charges, the airport charge set by the government, 1 2( , ; )a a G
*
jr , is the other 
candidate for the regulated level of airport charge. However, since 1 2( , ; ) 0a a G <*jr  as shown in Table 3, it is not 
practical to assume that the government sets the negative airport charges as the regulated level. 
21 In Table 4, the welfare effect of the regulation of airport charges is relatively large under Regime M compared 
to Regime PP, straightforwardly from Table 3. That is, the monopolistic operator has greater market power in 
determining the levels of airport charges, and the competition between the two airports is absent. Under Regime 
M, the regulation of airport charges mitigates these inefficiencies and generates a larger welfare effect. 
22 We can draw the same conclusion from the comparison of Figures 2 and 3. As explained in Section 4, the 
difference between Figures 2 and 3 arises solely from the difference in the service choice: i.e., in Figure 2, 
operators freely choose the service provided at their airports while, in Figure 3, the service is determined by the 
government to maximize the social surplus. By comparing these two figures, the difference in the allocation is 
observed only under Regime M within a limited range of x1 (for 110 5x− ≤ < − ), and the welfare effect is at most 
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questionable although this kind of regulation is widely implemented across the world. 
 
7.0 Conclusion 
This paper focuses on the allocation of services between two airports in a metropolitan area. 
Three types of airport operation, Regimes PP, M, and G, are considered. It is shown that the 
allocation of services vary depending on the locations of the airports and the types of airport 
operation. When the two airports are distant from each other, each airport provides two types of 
service, and the number of services provided at the airport closer to the CBD decreases as the 
distance between two airports decreases. The private operations (Regimes PP and M) lead to the 
excess entry of services in the airport closer to the CBD when operators are allowed to choose the 
services provided at their airports. Numerical simulations based on realistic parameter values 
provide quantitative insights on the effects of regulations. Section 3 shows that there are significant 
differences in the levels of social welfare among Regimes PP, M, and G, even if the allocation of 
services is the same. This result is due to the difference among the airport charges. Section 4 shows 
that regulation of service choices has little effect on the allocation of services. Finally, Section 5 
shows that welfare losses by deviation from optimal allocation of services are relatively small if the 
airport charges are fixed. As discussed in Section 6, the results above suggest that although the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
2.3 billion yen. Also note that, under Regime PP, there is no effect of the optimal regulation because both airport 
charges and the service choice are identical. These results also suggest that the regulation of the service choice has 
a limited impact on the social welfare. 
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regulation of the service choice is effective in some situations, it has a limited impact on efficiency. 
On the other hand, the regulation of the levels of airport charges are essential. 
Finally, we suggest topics for future research. First, it would be useful to deal with mixes of 
public and private operations in which one of two airports is operated by the government and the 
other by a private firm. There are some metropolitan areas where public and private airports coexist. 
Capacity choice is also an important issue. This is also relevant to practical policy because several 
metropolitan airports have undertaken the expansion of their capacity. In this case, it is necessary to 
consider the interaction of capacity choice and allocation of services between multiple airports. 
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Appendix A: The Inverse Demand Functions 
The inverse demand function for service S at airport j is calculated from the following: 
 .Sk Sj j
k
f Qσ =∑  
As we explained in Subsection 2.2, we have two cases of the relationship between boundaries. In 
case i), the inverse demand function ( )Sjp +Sk Slf f  is derived as follows: 
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In case ii), the inverse demand function ( | )Sjp Sk Slf f  is derived as follows: 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )















3 3 4 3
                 
Sk Sk
C H C
Sk kC H C HS
Sk S




H C H k kC HS
Sk S
C H C H C H
t f f
bt t b x vhC z b
f d
p
t f ft b xbt vhC
f d
σ ρ ρ ρρ ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ
σ ρ ρ ρρ ρ ρρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ
 + + − −  + + − − < −+ +








( ) ( ) ( )
( )












,  if ,
4 2
33 23
,  if ,
3 3 4 3
Sk Sk
C H C
Sk kC H H CS
Sk S
H C H C HS
Sk Sk
C H C Sk kC HS
Sk S
C H C H C H
t f f
bt t b x vhC z b
f d
p
t f ft b xbt vhC z b
f d
σ ρ ρ ρρ ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ
σρ ρ ρρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ
  + +  − −   + + − − < − + ++ =    +   − + −    + − − − ≥ − + + +
∑ ∑
∑ ∑




Appendix B: Parameters 
Population density of the City Cρ  is calibrated so that the population of the City with the size of 
100 square kilometers is equal to that of the Osaka Metropolitan Area. The population density of the 
Hinterland Hρ , on the other hand, is the average population density of Japan. 
To calibrate the access cost per a distance, t, we calculate the access cost to Kansai International 
Airport by railway for 50 locations in Osaka Metropolitan Area. According to these values, we use 
the weighted average of the access costs per kilometer for 50 cities as the value of t. 
The values of dI and dD, respectively, correspond to the average trip frequencies of international 
and domestic flights in Japan. To obtain the values of v and h, we assume that the flights at each 
airport are daily operated with equal intervals; therefore, all users of service S at each airport incur 
the identical average waiting time cost. We set 3,000 yen per an hour as the values of v, which is 
used in the Cost and Benefit Analysis of Kobe Airport (Kobe City, 2004). We set 5,475 hours 
(365 days 15 hours× ) as the value of h. We set the number of routes for services I and D as three 
and six, respectively, in order to adjust the scheduling cost for users close to realistic values. 
We use the average size of the ANA’s aircraft for the value of σ . The values of the cost 
parameters, Iω , Dω , and c, are calibrated from the following procedures. As Pels and Verhoef 
(2004) explained, the total delay cost for each carrier is equal to 5% of its total operating cost. 
Therefore, 95% of the total operating cost corresponds to the sum of costs for providing 
international and domestic flights. Using the financial data of JAL and ANA for 2004, we calculate 
the costs for providing each service S (S = I, D) according to the share of each service per revenue 
passenger kilometer so that the sum of them is equal to 95% of the total operating cost. Using the 
calculated total cost for providing each service, S, we set the average cost per flight for each service 
as the value of parameter Sω (S = I, D). To calibrate the value of parameter c, we set 5% of the total 
operating costs as the total delay costs. We set the value of c so that the total congestion cost based 
 33
on this model is equal to the total delay cost. 
The reservation price for each service is obtained through the calibration. The following table 
shows the calibrated number of passengers for each service at the two airports in the Osaka 
Metropolitan Area. In the following table, we assume that airport 1 locates at x1 = –11 (the distance 
between Osaka Station and Osaka International Airport) and airport 2 at x2 = 36 (the distance 
between Osaka Station and Kansai International Airport). Due to the asymmetry in congestion, the 
number of passengers for domestic flights at each airport is different from that in 2004. The total 
number of passengers for domestic flights, however, is close to that in 2004. 
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ID I D N 
ID (ID, ID) (ID, I) (ID, I) (ID, N) 
I (I, ID) (I, I) (I, D) (I, N) 
D (D, ID) (D, I) (D, D) (D, N) 
N (N, ID) (N, I) (N, D) (N, N) 
 
 
Table 2: Parameter Values 
 
Parameter Value Unit 
b  The boundary of the City 50 (kilometers) 
Cρ  Population density of the City 164 (thousand people) 
Hρ  Population density of the Hinterland 26 (thousand people) 
Id  Frequency for service I usage 0.17 (times per a year) 
Dd  Frequency for service D usage 0.73 (times per a year) 
v  Value of waiting time 3 (thousand yen per a year) 
h  Operating hours of airport 5475 (hours per a year) 
t  Access cost per a unit distance 0.1 (thousand yen per a kilometer) σ  Size of the aircraft 272 (seats) 
Iω  Marginal operation cost for service I 13522 (thousand yen per a flight) 
Dω  Marginal operation cost for service D 2015 (thousand yen per a flight) 
c  Marginal congestion cost for flights 0.01 (thousand yen per a square of flight) 
IC  Reservation price for service I 153 (thousand yen) 
DC  Reservation price for service D 41 (thousand yen) 
 
Table 3: Comparison of Social Surplus and Airport Charges 
 
















1x  (billion yen) (thousand yen) (billion yen) (thousand yen) (billion yen) (thousand yen) 
−50 808.9 7238  7412  3567 3775 692.2 18301 18301 6899 6899 1098.5 −17392 −18310 −8013 −8832  
−25 804.2 7328  7186  3656 3547 732.1 18263 18017 5754 6617 1081.0 −17277 −18017 −7911 −8538  
0 797.1 7418  6959  3746 3320 744.1 - 17630 5102 5488 1058.0 - −17630 −8085 −8245  
25 806.6 5995  6182  2216 2508 703.8 - 17630 4835 5028 1028.3 - −17630 −8181 −7729  
 
 
Table 4: Welfare Effects of Regulations at Various Locations of Airport 1 (Unit: billion yen) 
 
Welfare effect of the regulation on service choice Welfare effect of the regulation on airport charges 




( );PP∆ 1 2r , r  ( );M∆ 1 2r , r  ( )* ; ,PP ID ID∆  ( )* ; ,PP D ID∆  ( )* ; ,M ID ID∆  ( )* ; ,M D ID∆  
−50 0.0 0.0 115.7 263.4 232.4 349.8 
−30 0.0 0.0 109.0 252.9 234.4 347.1 
−10 0.0 0.0 98.7 235.6 244.0 242.0 
10 7.1 7.1 85.7 124.0 326.1 155.2 
30 0.0 0.0 41.5 59.2 171.1 166.4 
 
Note: ( )* 1 2; ,Z a a∆  (Z = PP, M and (a1, a2) = (ID, ID), (D, ID)) measures the welfare effect of the regulation of the levels of airport charges while ( );Z∆ 1 2r , r  
captures the welfare effect of the regulation of the service choice. In calculating these deviations, we use the levels of parametric airport charges (shown in Section 
5) as the levels of the regulated airport charges. 
 
 
Table B1: The Results of the Calibration (Unit: thousand people) 
 
International Domestic 








Calibration - 5583 9742 2072
The Passengers in 2004 - 5596 9742 2089
 
 
